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ARTICLE 
 
“(Democratization) is like the story of the Huba Huba tree. There are two 
prerequisites for its growth: soil and climate. . . . If these are not both present, 
then look for any other tree to emerge . . . but not the Huba Huba.” 
 
– Jordanian parliamentary official, February 1993 
 
 
In the summer of 2003, election fever 
hit Jordan. Throughout the country, 
citizens hotly debated the outcome of 
the upcoming poll and hung photos of 
their favorite candidate in cars and shop 
windows. Enthusiasm crossed class, 
sectarian and regional lines, illustrating that 
Jordanians would indeed turn out to vote 
when motivated. More than 5.5 million 
votes were cast throughout the country, 
many at considerable personal cost to the 
voters. On August 18, typically noisy stores, 
restaurants and street corners fell silent as 
the results were announced. Shouts of joy 
and dancing in the streets followed moments 
later, as Jordan‟s Diana Karazon 
defeated Syria‟s Ruwaida Attieh to win the 
Beirut-based SuperStar contest, the Arab 
world‟s answer to American Idol. 1 
 
Just two months earlier, Jordanians 
also turned out – in much smaller numbers 
– to vote in their national parliamentary 
elections, the fourth contest held since 
political re-liberalization was launched in 
1989. Although the government reported a 
57-percent turnout – a record high in 
recent years – the general apathy toward 
that poll resulted from a steady deterioration 
of the political climate in Jordan over 
the past decade, particularly since the 
delay of the elections originally scheduled 
for November 2001 and in the climate of 
the second intifada in neighboring Israel/ 
Palestine. Jordan had embarked on an 
ambitious process of political and economic 
liberalization in 1989, heralding the reforms 
as the most extensive democratization 
program in the region. While the post-1989 
process allows for competitive elections, 
some level of pluralism and the emergence 
of civil society, opposition parties and 
groups have voiced considerable – and 
well-founded – concern regarding the state 
of liberalization in the kingdom. Especially 
since the signing of the 1994 peace treaty 
with Israel, the monarchy has become 
steadily less tolerant of the levels of 
pluralism, civil society and dissent that had 
flourished in the atmosphere of 1989-93.2 
Prior to 1989, King Hussein had only 
sporadically supported periods of highly 
limited political liberalization. Even then, 
political openings were, as they are now, 
largely defensive and always cautious. 
When the regime was surprised by the 
electoral successes of the opposition in the 
1989 elections – in which Islamists won 
some 40 percent of the seats and opposition 
parties together held some 60 percent 
of the assembly – the government responded 
with a new elections law that 
favored rural and pro-regime areas, largely 
at the expense of Islamists. In the late 
1990s, the regime promulgated a series of 
new and more repressive laws on press 
and publications in a clear attempt to rein in 
a media that the regime felt had overstepped 
its bounds.3 This process of deliberalization 
continued even after the 
succession in the monarchy itself, from the 
long-serving King Hussein (1953-1999) to 
his eldest son, King Abdullah II. 
The new king dissolved the parliament 
two years later, in 2001. During the 
subsequent two-plus years during which 
parliament was absent from Jordanian 
public life, the king ruled instead by decree, 
largely through the office of the prime 
minister. The regime passed some 250 
emergency and temporary laws (many 
reining in liberalization still further), more 
than it had from independence in 1946 until 
2001. Jordanians also saw a series of 
delays as the elections scheduled for 
November 2001 were postponed repeatedly. 
When the elections did finally occur 
on June 17, 2003, many questions remained 
unanswered. As the first elections to take 
place since 1997, the first since the dissolution 
of parliament in 2001, and the first 
under King Abdullah II, did these elections 
mark a return to meaningful democratization 
in Jordan? Or were they merely a 
cosmetic exercise to placate the opposition 
and please international creditors? 
This paper provides an analysis of 
Jordan‟s 2003 parliamentary elections in an 
effort to answer these questions. After 
examining the overall liberalization process 
from 1989 to 2002, we explore the delays 
in the fourth round of national elections and 
the 2003 elections themselves and their 
implications for democratization.4 We 
argue that political de-liberalization in 
Jordan is largely the result of regime 
insecurity and a perceived need to placate 
what it sees as essential allies: the United 
States and Israel. However, the manipulation 
of the electoral system is not merely 
preventing democratic processes from 
moving forward; it is further entrenching 
existing elites and alienating political 
moderates in ways that are likely to make 
a restarting of the process in the future 
more difficult. In this connection Jordan 
looks less like a stalled democratic transition 
than an entirely new kind of hybrid 
regime, neither typically authoritarian nor 
meaningfully democratic. 
 
 
POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION, 
1989-2002 
 
In recent years, scholars have increasingly 
noted that many of the states that had 
begun “transitions” to democracy had not 
moved far along that path. Although 
Huntington‟s much-touted analysis of 
“Third Wave” democratic transitions failed 
to include cases from the Arab world,5 
scholars of the Middle East produced a 
vast literature on the broad and significant 
trend toward political liberalization begun 
by many states in the region.6 Considerable 
attention was directed at exploring the 
compatibility of Islam and democracy, with 
most scholars agreeing that the large 
number of Islamist groups already engaging 
in pluralist politics provides sufficient 
evidence to argue that there is no necessary 
incompatibility.7 While there is of 
course no reason to believe that all Islamist 
groups will be equally supportive of democratic 
and pluralist reforms, the main 
obstacles to continued progress toward 
democratization in the region turned out to 
be the regimes themselves. Initial openings 
often included liberalization of the press, 
the introduction of elections (often including 
the legalization of political parties), and 
the adoption of the language of democracy 
by almost all political actors, including 
sweeping promises of democratization by 
regimes as diverse as those of Jordan, 
Kuwait, Morocco and Yemen. Even Saudi 
Arabia introduced an appointed consultative 
council in the early 1990s. Regimes 
described their polities as “democratizing,” 
but none has even approached a state of 
consolidation. 
 
By the mid-1990s, it became evident 
that few of these processes would live up 
to their promises, as openings were reversed 
or manipulated in ways that made 
talk of progress toward democracy ridiculous. 
What the region witnessed was not a 
retreat to authoritarianism, but the emergence 
of entirely new kinds of nondemocratic 
regimes. Thomas Carothers 
and Daniel Brumberg, among others, have 
called for the exploration of these new 
kinds of hybrid regimes, including comparative 
studies of their characteristics and the 
processes that led to their emergence.8 
We argue that Jordan is an example of a 
new sort of hybrid, one in which the regime 
continues to proclaim its commitment to 
democratization while elected parliaments 
are made increasingly irrelevant to governance 
and political freedoms are harshly 
constrained. 
 
The kingdom initiated the muchheralded 
program of political and economic 
liberalization in 1989 following riots and 
demonstrations in southern Jordan. Citizens 
protested not only against the social pain 
associated with an International Monetary 
Fund austerity program, but also against 
corruption and nepotism in government. 
Stunned by the public outcry, King Hussein 
initiated the liberalization program in an 
attempt to stabilize the country and restore 
public support for the regime.9 In the first 
several years of the program, liberalization 
included easing government controls over 
the media and restoring parliamentary life 
and electoral democracy for the lower 
house of parliament.10 In those first elections, 
the Muslim Brotherhood was the 
best-organized group in the kingdom, 
especially since political parties had been 
formally banned since the late 1950s. 
Although the Brotherhood was registered 
as a charity rather than a political organization, 
its members nonetheless secured 22 of 
the 80 seats in the chamber, with 12 more 
going to independent Islamists. For Dr. 
Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat, a leader of the 
Muslim Brotherhood who was shortly 
thereafter elected speaker of the parliament, 
the liberalization program was long 
overdue and came only after the “wake up 
call” of the April 1989 riots: 
 
 
The (liberalization) process was 
triggered by the need for freedom and 
reform. Beginning in the second half 
of the Eighties, the government 
exceeded its limits in many issue areas, 
especially economic and financial. 
This led to the April movement, which 
was a warning to the government of 
the importance of conducting reform. 
The gateway to reform was the 1989 
elections.11 
 
Those elections yielded 13 seats for leftists 
and pan-Arab nationalists and 33 for 
conservative regime loyalists, in addition to 
the 34 seats noted above for Islamists, 
giving opposition voices a clear majority. 
While the political opposition was energized 
but fragmented, many conservative regime 
loyalists feared for the status quo. As one 
cynic within the regime suggested: 
 
Changes have more chance of survival 
if they are from the bottom up, not 
from the top down. And the changes 
here are from the top down. It is like a 
love story. One is very enthusiastic 
early on . . . . Then it is more like 
marriage later on. One becomes more 
sober and less enthusiastic as time 
goes on.12 
 
Similarly, one of Jordan‟s former prime 
ministers also took pains to emphasize that 
Jordan‟s transition would involve minimal 
liberalization but not full democratization: 
 
The ceiling of democracy will be 
raised, but the shape of the house will 
not change . . . . We are not going in 
the direction of the U.K. model. Jordan 
needs a strong central leader who will 
both reign and rule. . . . Still, it is not 
like elections in the United States, 
which are like a popular coup d‟état 
every four years.13 
 
With a strong opposition parliament and 
in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War, the 
monarchy assembled a large cross section 
of Jordan‟s political elite, including key 
elements of the opposition, in order to draft 
the Jordanian National Charter (al-Mithaq 
al-Watani al-Urduni). Completed in 1991, 
the document formalized the political 
principles of pluralism, liberalization and 
loyalty to the Hashemite monarchy. The 
regime then lifted martial law for the first 
time in more than 20 years and moved to 
legalize political parties for the first time in 
more than 30 years.14 Thus in the early 
1990s, Jordan‟s political liberalization 
process was clearly the most comprehensive 
in the entire Arab world. 
 
With Jordan alienated from the United 
States, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia for its 
neutral stance in the 1991 Gulf War, King 
Hussein soon thereafter sought to rebuild 
those ties. Jordan‟s strongest card with 
Washington was to make peace with 
Israel, a process that was wildly unpopular 
among Jordanian citizens. The peace 
treaty signed in 1994 therefore came at 
considerable expense to political freedoms, 
and regime tolerance for oppositional 
voices and political dissent declined precipitously. 
The government changed the 
elections law just months before for the 
1993 elections, switching to a one-person, 
one-vote system that undercut the ability of 
opposition voices to win seats. The 
previous elections law had allowed citizens 
a number of votes matching the number of 
representatives for their respective (multimember) 
parliamentary district. Citizens in 
the city of Irbid, for example, had nine 
representatives in parliament and hence 
nine votes. The new elections law ended 
this practice and also featured a set of 
uneven electoral districts that favored rural 
pro-regime constituencies over more urban 
bases of support for opposition groups from 
the secular left to the religious right. 
 
The main concern for the monarchy, 
however, was to curb the potential parliamentary 
power of groups such as the 
Islamic Action Front (IAF), the political 
wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, which 
strongly opposed a peace treaty with 
Israel. In addition, secularly inclined 
regime loyalists were alarmed at the 
success of the Islamists in 1989. Summarizing 
the view of many within the regime, 
a high-ranking parliamentary official 
lamented: 
 
The question therefore is, how can 
you secure democracy? I fear democracy 
may be a vehicle only, for one 
group to reach the number-one status 
– one group which sees all truth in 
one book. Then there will be room for 
no other book, no other view. If that 
happens, where will I be? It will be 
time for people like me to go, . . . but 
one cannot say this here. One would 
be accused as a kafir or as so many 
Salman Rushdies. It could be the 
democratic path to authoritarianism.15 
 
It was with fears such as these in mind 
that the regime changed the elections law 
prior to the next round of elections, and the 
strategy worked: the IAF won only 16 
seats (down from the Muslim 
Brotherhood‟s 22 in 1989), while independent 
Islamists captured only 6 (rather than 
12) seats. 16 Leftist candidates took 13 
seats in 1989, but only 7 in 1993. 
 
During the period between the 1993 
and 1997 elections, political freedoms 
continued to decline. In spring 1997, the 
government introduced a harsh amendment 
to the Press and Publications Law, requiring 
all newspapers to put forth capital 
reserves against which violations to strict 
limitations would be debited. Thirteen 
weekly newspapers, most affiliated with 
opposition parties, were immediately forced 
to cease publication. In this increasingly 
restrictive climate, Jordan‟s opposition 
parties threatened an electoral boycott in 
1997 unless the elections law was reformed. 
When no such revision took place, 
the IAF led an 11-party bloc in boycotting 
the 1997 elections, yielding a 1997-2001 
parliament dominated by pro-regime 
conservatives, tribal leaders and very few 
opposition voices. The new parliament 
included only 6 independent Islamists, 6 
left-leaning pan-Arab nationalists and an 
overwhelming 68 seats out of 80 for 
traditional tribal leaders, former government 
officials and other pro-regime conservatives. 
While the left joined the Islamists 
in condemning the elections law, some 
sympathetic to the pro-democracy left 
suggested that the new law had actually 
worked in their favor, but they were unable 
to see it: 
 
Why is the Left opposed to the 1993 
election law anyway? It hurt the 
Islamists. They are somehow Left 
without being progressive. They are 
old Left. Just oppositionists as a 
career. They still act like they are an 
opposition in exile. They don‟t know 
how to work inside the system, even 
when they are in it.17 
 
For another democracy activist, the 
problem was not just the elections law, but 
also the increasing role of the General 
Intelligence Directorate (GID), or 
mukhabarat, in public life: 
 
The 1993 election law curtailed 
Palestinian and Islamist representation 
preceding the 1994 peace treaty (with 
Israel). And with the 1994 treaty the 
mukhabarat role actually increased in 
Jordan. They became stronger with 
the king‟s failing health. (Reformist 
prime minister) Kabariti was actually 
good on reforms and freedoms, but he 
also allowed the GID a still larger role. 
But (conservative prime minister) 
Rawabdah was absolutely awful. And 
(conservative prime minister) Majali, 
God, he‟s totally mukhabarat (secret 
police).18 
 
These types of charges regarding the 
infiltration of the intelligence services even 
within the liberalization program came 
unsolicited from several quarters, from 
political dissidents and democracy activists 
to generally pro-regime journalists and 
even former government ministers. One 
former prime minister, while praising 
liberalization overall, expressed several 
concerns, including the increased role of 
the mukhabarat: 
 
The process of democratization has 
reached the point of no return. The 
regime cannot change that. But they 
can and do try to contain it. They 
actually have strengthened the 
security apparatus in Jordan . . . . 
Nothing, nothing is decided on any 
topic without the mukhabarat. No 
policy, political or otherwise, is 
uninfluenced by them. Probably 
(most) journalists are influenced by 
them. If there is an article, they know 
about it before it is printed. 
 
The key, he argued, was to restore meaningful 
parliamentary life and above all to 
apply the rule of law, thereby curbing the 
power of the GID. 
 
The 1997-2001 parliament, pliant 
though it was, was dissolved by King 
Abdullah in 2001, ostensibly in preparation 
for the scheduled November 2001 elections. 
But with large-scale protests 
emerging after the outbreak of the second 
intifada in October 2000, and again with 
the American attacks on Afghanistan in 
October 2001, government officials argued 
that the “climate of dissent” was a lessthan- 
ideal atmosphere for elections, even 
with the 1993 law still in place.19 In the 
parliament‟s absence, the palace ruled by 
decree, issuing more than 250 controversial 
temporary laws over the course of two 
years. Such temporary laws are permitted 
by the constitution in cases of national 
security when the parliament is not in 
session, and subject to parliamentary 
approval when the assembly reconvenes. 
Opposition voices contested the “urgent 
security necessity” of many of the laws, 
which clamped down on political demonstrations 
and created elastic measures to 
curb dissent both on the street and in the 
media. In fact, the public was unaware of 
more than half of these temporary laws 
until parliament reconvened in 2003 and the 
government presented some 250 laws for 
review.20 
 
In a particularly telling 2003 incident, 
Jordan‟s first elected woman parliamentarian, 
Tujan al-Faysal, was convicted for 
publishing on-line an open letter to the 
government. In the letter, Faysal questioned 
whether security issues were really 
at stake when the prime minister introduced 
a temporary law that increased 
insurance premiums. More controversially, 
she noted that the prime minister‟s family, 
which dominates the insurance industry in 
Jordan, stood to gain considerably from the 
measure. The former parliamentary 
representative was arrested, tried, and 
convicted for defaming the prime minister, 
the government, and the kingdom. Since 
Faysal is one of the most outspoken voices 
for liberalization and extending women‟s 
rights in Jordan, many in the pro-democracy 
movement understood that the act 
was intended to signal the regime‟s unwillingness 
to tolerate political dissent. After 
Faysal had served one month in jail, King 
Abdullah suspended the rest of the 18- 
month sentence. But because she had 
been convicted of a misdemeanor in state 
security court – a verdict that cannot be 
appealed – she is now ineligible to ever 
again put forth her candidacy for office. 
 
 
POSTPONING THE 2003 
ELECTIONS 
 
When the fourth round of elections 
since 1989 did not take place as expected 
in November 2001, opposition groups were 
quick to accuse the government of reversing 
the democratization process. The delay 
added another piece of evidence to the 
case of activists and political figures who 
claimed that the regime had abandoned the 
push toward meaningful democratization in 
1993 and was no longer interested in 
reinvigorating it. IAF Secretary-General 
Hamseh Mansour put it this way: 
“Jordan‟s experiment with democracy has 
not really been reversed; in fact, it died in 
childbirth.” 21 For its part, the regime 
claimed to have postponed the elections 
because the system of magnetized voting 
cards would not be ready in time. More 
likely, the rising regional tensions resulting 
from the second intifada and the U.S. 
invasions of Afghanistan and later Iraq led 
the regime to constrain public expression of 
political dissent via protests and the media. 
In this climate, the regime was uncertain as 
to whether elections would return the sort 
of opposition parliament that would challenge 
the regime‟s foreign-policy initiatives. 
 
Expectations regarding new parliamentary 
elections were repeatedly dashed. 
Clearly external security issues were major 
concerns for the regime, but the monarchy 
was also concerned with internal opposition, 
especially over the possibility of 
another U.S. war on Iraq. While the 1989 
protests in southern Jordan led the regime 
to consider liberalization, protests in 
December 2002 in the southern city of 
Maan led the government instead to crack 
down harshly on dissent. The regime 
labeled its opponents “Wahhabis,” a word 
that has become a generic term for militant 
Sunni Islamists, but which more importantly 
implies that they are not really from 
Jordan.22 Similarly, civil unrest in Maan in 
1998 was blamed on secular leftists who 
were pro-Iraqi or perhaps even Iraqi 
agents themselves. In these and other 
instances, everything from local social 
unrest to actual militancy is blamed on 
various types of “outside agitators.” 
 
In the Jordanian context, most opposition 
has been explicitly loyal, and indeed 
the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood 
have a long pattern of mutual understanding 
regarding regime loyalty and policy 
opposition.23 This type of pattern was 
codified in the 1991 National Charter, 
which set the stage for limited political 
pluralism and participation, but within the 
context of loyalty to the Hashemite monarchy. 
The tensions between the opposition 
and the monarchy, therefore, turn not so 
much on the nature of the political system, 
but rather on profound differences regarding 
specific policy choices as well as the 
desired extent of political liberalization. 
 
Thus public anger over electoral 
postponements is part of the broader 
concern over unpopular elections laws, 
renewed restrictions on the media, and 
government bans on such democratic acts 
as public demonstrations. One of the 
temporary laws issued in August 2001 
required that protest organizers obtain 
permission three days in advance; in 
practice, few permits are ever granted, 
and, when they are, the government often 
dictates the locale and even the number of 
protesters.24 In terms of policy, the 
regime is intent on maintaining its 1994 
peace treaty with Israel, as well as its 
foreign aid and military links to the United 
States and the United Kingdom. Both 
policy areas are 
increasingly 
unpopular within 
Jordan and have 
become sources 
of social unrest. 
Political parties 
and professional 
associations 
have repeatedly 
made clear their 
anger over 
Jordan‟s peace treaty with Israel, while the 
Palestinian death toll mounted in the West 
Bank and Gaza. Jordan‟s electoral delays, 
therefore, must be seen not only in the 
context of a changing regional security 
environment, but also in the context of a 
broader liberalization beginning in 1989, 
and, more important, de-liberalization as 
the earlier process began to erode in 1993 
and correspondingly Jordan‟s “political 
opening” began to close. 
 
Thus the question of electoral delays is 
not the core problem but rather a symptom 
of the broader crisis between the government 
and the opposition, and indeed 
between the regime and Jordanian society, 
over the entire political liberalization 
process. When King Abdullah II first 
ascended the throne, he seemed to show 
signs of the desire to reinvigorate the 
liberalization process and did not hesitate to 
allow municipal elections to proceed apace 
in July 1999.25 Since then, however, 
regional issues have dominated the 
regime‟s agenda at the expense of political 
freedoms at home. 
 
The regime‟s response turned not just 
on electoral delays, but mainly on its new 
campaign, dubbed “Jordan First.” This 
slogan conveys the regime‟s nationalist 
approach and its intention to tolerate no 
exploitation of 
divisions within 
Jordanian 
society – 
whether 
between 
secularists and 
Islamists or 
between 
Palestinians and 
Transjordanians. 
But the slogan 
has also been read by the opposition as 
either avoidance of commitment to broader 
Arab or Islamic concerns, or as a statement 
brooking no dissent, and hence no 
democracy, within increasingly security-oriented 
Jordanian politics. Scott Greenwood 
has argued further that the regime 
manipulated the elections laws while 
pursuing economic liberalization, in order to 
maintain the external funding on which the 
kingdom is dependent and to placate two 
key regime constituencies: Transjordanians 
and the business elite.26 
 
Given the overwhelming pro-regime 
majority in the 1997-2001 parliament and 
the regime‟s efforts to suppress political 
dissent in the media and via protest activities, 
the kingdom‟s professional associations 
emerged in the late 1990s as perhaps 
the only real remaining locus of political 
opposition. The wealthier of these associations, 
particularly the Islamist-dominated 
engineers association, led the national 
campaign against normalization of relations 
with Israel.27 In this repressive climate, 
opposition parties such as the Islamic 
Action Front were particularly eager to 
return to the sphere of state-sanctioned 
political engagement. Thus when the 
government announced a firm date for the 
elections – June 17, 2003 – all the opposition 
parties expressed a willingness to 
participate even though they viewed the 
electoral system as highly flawed. 
 
 
2003 PARLIAMENTARY 
ELECTIONS 
 
The 2003 elections were finally held 
under still another elections law, which had 
been announced in July 2001. The new 
law lowered the age of voting eligibility 
from 19 to 18 and increased the number of 
seats from 80 to 104. The government 
announced that redistricting would address 
some of the earlier inequalities, but in fact 
the distribution of the additional seats 
maintained the advantage of the largely 
pro-regime Transjordanian south at the 
expense of the more oppositional – and 
Palestinian-populated – regions in and 
around Amman. In February 2003, King 
Abdullah revised the system once more 
with a new decree that added six additional 
seats intended to ensure at least minimal 
representation for women. In the previous 
three elections combined (1989, 1993 and 
1997), Tujan al-Faysal was the only 
successful female candidate. However, 
she won as a Circassian running in one of 
the dedicated minority seats, succeeding 
with a few thousand votes while others lost 
non-quota seats with many more votes. 
The new women‟s quota was intended to 
guarantee that at least six women would 
enter the new parliament.28 While the 
Islamic Action Front originally opposed the 
women‟s quota, it eventually included for 
the first time a woman, Hayat al-Musayni, 
among its slate of 30 candidates.29 No 
Jordanian woman won a seat outright in 
2003, but Musayni won a larger percentage 
of votes in her district than did any other 
female candidate nationwide. Thus the 
first woman seated in the new 2003-2007 
parliament was neither secular nor feminist, 
as the IAF feared, but rather a 
conservative Islamist activist. Five additional 
female candidates were also 
awarded seats on the basis of percentage 
of votes received in their districts. 
 
Overall, the Islamic Action Front 
succeeded in getting 17 of its party members 
elected (including Musayni). Aside 
from the IAF, five independent Islamists 
were also elected, including such highprofile 
conservative Islamists as the IAF‟s 
Muhammad Abu Faris and former IAF 
member Abd al-Munim Abu Zant, whom 
the party had expelled from its ranks just 
before the election. As expected, most of 
the parliamentary seats went to traditional 
tribal leaders or former government 
officials, putting at least 62 of the 110 seats 
into the hands of loyalist pro-regime 
figures. The official voter turnout stood at 
57 percent of eligible voters, with few 
mishaps or irregularities. The IAF did 
complain that extensive vote-rigging had 
taken place in the southern city of Karak, 
though the government responded by 
acknowledging irregularities but asserting 
that they had been caught in time and 
“taken care of.” While the overall turnout 
was respectable, the numbers varied 
considerably across districts. Turnout in 
rural areas, for example, tends to be very 
high, while urban Palestinian-majority 
districts register the lowest turnouts in the 
kingdom, suggesting that these neighborhoods 
have limited confidence in the 
government, the electoral system and their 
own political efficacy. 
 
 
THE 2003-07 PARLIAMENT 
 
Following the elections, government 
and opposition figures alike began to 
speculate on what sort of parliament this 
would be. While the assembly is widely 
seen as a pro-regime body, it is not without 
significant – and far from timid – opposition 
voices. When the deputies convened 
for the first time, IAF deputies created a 
stir over the oath of loyalty. While they 
joined all the deputies in swearing allegiance 
to King Abdullah, the Islamist 
delegates added that they would only do so 
as long as the king ruled in accordance 
with Islam. Indeed, the IAF made clear 
that its participation in the elections in no 
way represented its approval of the 
elections laws, which it still regards as 
systematically biased against Islamist and 
Palestinian representation. But party 
leaders argue that they decided to participate 
in the electoral process in large part in 
order to change it. Dr. Abd al-Latif 
Arabiyyat, chair of the IAF consultative 
council and former parliamentary speaker, 
chose not to run but nevertheless defended 
the party‟s decision: “Our decision is 
based on the strong belief that the time has 
come to rectify all the wrongdoings that 
have been committed by the government 
over the past years.”30 For the IAF, this 
includes not only the series of temporary 
laws, but also the 1994 peace treaty with 
Israel. On these points, most of the 
secular left and nationalists agree with the 
Islamists. 
 
While Islamist and other traditional 
opposition voices are certain to continue 
challenging the regime on these and other 
issues, the assembly has another possible – 
and unexpected – opposition bloc: former 
government officials. These include former 
cabinet ministers and even former prime 
minister Abd al-Rauf al-Rawabdeh, whose 
cabinet was dismissed in 2000 and who is 
widely said to hold a grudge against the 
regime. What these individuals possess that 
the traditional opposition mostly lacks are 
high-level connections in the government, 
detailed knowledge of how the executive 
works, and – in some cases – strong and 
recent personal resentment. Their combination 
of experience and attitude could 
potentially create the sorts of alliances 
among other pro-regime deputies that 
Islamists and leftists are unlikely to forge. 
 
During the extraordinary session of 
parliament convened from July through 
September 2003, the assembly took up the 
issue of examining the 250-plus temporary 
laws. Despite the initial indications that the 
opposition deputies would be obstructionist, 
the functioning of these first months 
reflected the sorts of debates of earlier 
assemblies. The Islamists complained 
about the popularity of SuperStar contestant 
(and eventual winner) Diana Karazon, 
while other deputies congratulated the 
government on its support of the national 
soccer team, which defeated Iran, to great 
national joy. 
 
The temporary laws, however, suggested 
that an earlier, tacit agreement 
between the conservative, pro-regime 
deputies and the regime itself remained intact. 
That is, many have long contended 
that King Hussein allowed the deputies 
final say over many domestic issues in 
exchange for support for his foreign-policy 
programs, notably the peace with Israel 
and now the close relations with the United 
States. Government officials and opposition 
figures agree that this “agreement” 
has not been formally articulated since the 
days when the peace treaty was being 
negotiated, but many understand the 
bargain to still be intact.31 
 
In this connection, among the first 
temporary laws to be examined were one 
changing the language of a law that was 
seen as supporting honor killings (by being 
lenient in sentencing those convicted of 
honor crimes) and one that extended 
citizenship to children of Jordanian mothers, 
a right previously given only to children 
of Jordanian fathers. Both temporary laws 
were rejected by the new parliament within 
the first weeks of the extraordinary 
session. While the king and queen have 
been on record strongly supporting these 
changes, they remained silent in the face of 
their defeat in parliament. In addition to 
the alleged, unstated agreement that the 
monarchy would stay out of domestic 
issues, others speculated that the IAF 
pushed to review these two laws early in 
the extraordinary session because they 
were the only laws for which they could 
mobilize support and thus win an early 
“victory” in the new assembly. In either 
case, the new assembly has done little to 
challenge the regime on key issues, both 
domestic and foreign, and therefore can be 
seen as an overwhelmingly pro-regime 
assembly. 
 
The resumption of parliamentary life in 
Jordan is certainly an important step in 
furthering the country‟s political freedoms. 
But with the remaining restrictions on 
political expression and freedom of speech, 
the monarchy is sadly far from where it 
might easily have been, had it continued or 
even maintained the openings of the early 
1990s. Indeed, Jordan in 2003 resembles 
not so much a country on the road to 
democracy as a new hybrid of the sort 
described as “liberalized autocracy” by 
Brumberg and “dominant-power politics” 
by Carothers.32 Each points to cases in 
which initial political openings mark less an 
advancement toward democracy than the 
emergence of new hybrid forms of nondemocratic 
rule. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Jordan‟s 2003 elections illustrate 
neither a commitment nor a lack of commitment 
to democratic reform in the 
Hashemite kingdom. Many in the government 
as well as in the opposition believe 
that the regime would like to push for 
further reforms but feel that either the 
timing is not right or the citizenry and 
political parties have not matured to the 
point at which real democratization is 
viable. Others argue that the regime has 
never been committed to meaningful 
political liberalization and has used the 
language and artifacts of democracy to 
legitimate its continued rule in a climate in 
which authoritarianism is increasingly 
rejected on an international as well as a 
domestic level. Whatever the case (and it 
may well be some combination of the two), 
we argue that the process of reversing or 
halting the political liberalization measures 
introduced in the early 1990s has been 
largely the product of regime insecurity 
rather than a lack of commitment to 
eventual reform. Perhaps more important, 
the regime has felt the need to placate 
what it sees as essential allies: the United 
States and Israel. Following Carothers and 
Brumberg, however, we also argue that the 
manipulation of the electoral system is not 
merely preventing democratic processes 
from moving forward; it is further enr 
trenching existing elites and alienating 
political moderates in ways that are likely 
to make a “restarting” of the process in the 
future more difficult. 
 
As a new kind of hybrid regime, 
Jordan continues to locate the language of 
democracy centrally within its political 
rhetoric, as indicated by King Abdullah‟s 
speech at the first regular session of the 
new parliament on December 1, 2003. 
The king called for the dissemination of a 
“culture of democracy” and for a “national 
dialogue that will lead to convening a 
national congress to discuss the different 
economic, social and political issues, and to 
study viable solutions for them.” The king 
further emphasized to the parliament his 
concerns for the rights of women, the 
independence of the judiciary, and the role 
of the assembly in achieving democracy in 
the kingdom.33 
 
At the same time, the elected assembly 
has little to do with meaningful processes 
of governance, serving more to 
rubberstamp regime initiatives or as an 
outlet for political debate in a carefully 
controlled environment. Election laws and 
districting are manipulated to produce a 
majority-compliant assembly, while the 
senate, or upper house of parliament – 
which must approve any legislation put 
forth by the elected lower house – remains 
a royally-appointed body. As former prime 
minister and former senator Taher Masri 
noted, there is much significance in the 
king‟s selection of former prime minister 
Zaid al-Rifai to head the senate.34 Rifai 
strongly opposed political liberalization in 
1989 and continues to oppose it today. 
Likewise, the senate that began its term in 
January 2003 notably lacked many of the 
strong pro-reform voices of previous years, 
including Masri himself, suggesting a desire 
to prevent meaningful reform from emerging 
through the elected lower assembly. 
Considering this, together with the serious 
restrictions on expressing political dissent in 
the media and through public assembly, one 
can hardly argue that Jordan is engaged in 
a meaningful process of democratization, 
regardless of the rhetoric that emanates 
from the highest offices. For these reasons, 
and because the “reversals” are now 
a decade old, Jordan should best be 
understood as a hybrid regime, where 
democratic practices are present but 
shallow, and where power remains in 
essentially the same hands as prior to 
liberalization.. 
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